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The amplitude-encoding case of the double random phase encoding technique is examined by defining a cost
function as a metric to compare an attempted decryption against the corresponding original input image. For
the case when a cipher–text pair has been obtained and the correct decryption key is unknown, an iterative
attack technique can be employed to ascertain the key. During such an attack the noise in the output field for
an attempted decryption can be used as a measure of a possible decryption key’s correctness. For relatively
small systems, i.e., systems involving fewer than 55 pixels, the output decryption of every possible key can
be examined to evaluate the distribution of the keys in key space in relation to their relative performance when
carrying out decryption. However, in order to do this for large systems, checking every single key is currently
impractical. One metric used to quantify the correctness of a decryption key is the normalized root mean
squared (NRMS) error. The NRMS is a measure of the cumulative intensity difference between the input and
decrypted images. We identify a core term in the NRMS, which we refer to as the difference parameter, d.
Expressions for the expected value (or mean) and variance of d are derived in terms of the mean and variance
of the output field noise, which is shown to be circular Gaussian. These expressions assume a large sample set
(number of pixels and keys). We show that as we increase the number of samples used, the decryption error
obeys the statistically predicted characteristic values. Finally, we corroborate previously reported simulations
in the literature by using the statistically derived expressions. © 2009 Optical Society of AmericaOCIS codes: 200.4740, 100.2000, 070.2580, 030.6600.
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t. INTRODUCTION
ryptography [1–4] has been recognized as important by
overnments and individuals throughout history. With re-
ent technological advances in computer networking and
lobal communication, information security has become
ver more significant. Access to powerful desktop comput-
rs, which can be used to attack such systems, is there-
ore accompanied by a demand for higher security, and
his leads to increasingly powerful encryption techniques
eing developed.
Information security based on optical encryption [5–13]
s of particular interest, as it offers the possibility of high-
peed parallel encryption of 2D image data. One such
ethod of optical encryption is known as the double ran-
om phase encryption (DRPE) technique [5]. DRPE in-
olves the use of two 2D random phase keys, one placed in
he input image domain and one placed in the Fourier do-
ain of an optical 2f imaging system. If the two phase
eys are generated by using statistically independent
hite noises, then the encrypted image is also stationary
hite noise. Since its introduction in 1995, the DRPE has
enerated much interest and has been the focus of many
tudies [14–21]. The physical implementation of such an
ptical system gives rise to many practical issues; how-1084-7529/09/092033-10/$15.00 © 2ver, a thorough analysis of the DRPE technique itself is
xtremely important if it is to be utilized.
Depending on the form of the input data to be en-
rypted, two modes of operation of the DRPE technique
an be identified:
1. Amplitude encoding (AE), with a grayscale input im-
ge, and
2. Phase encoding (PE), where the input phase is
odulated.
hile the optical systems used to encrypt the data in both
ases are very similar, there are significant differences in
he decryption, analysis, and breaking of these encoding
ystems.
In the case when a PE input image (phase data) is
sed, both the image and the Fourier plane encryption
eys, R1,e=exp+j2 ax ,y and R2,e=exp+j2 bu ,v,
re needed during the decryption process [21], where x
nd y denote spatial coordinates, u and v denote coordi-
ates in the frequency domain, and a and b are the input
nd the Fourier plane phase key values, respectively. For
he AE case discussed here, it is only necessary to know
he Fourier plane key, R2,e, for decryption [22].
In the analysis presented below it is always assumed009 Optical Society of America
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2034 J. Opt. Soc. Am. A/Vol. 26, No. 9 /September 2009 Monaghan et al.hat the phase key will be the same size (have the same
umber of pixels) as the input image. It is possible, when
sing a DRPE system, to get partial (imperfect) decryp-
ions using keys unrelated to the correct key. In order to
ave a complete overview of the decryption capabilities of
ll the keys in key space [22] one should evaluate the out-
ut decryption produced by every possible key. For rela-
ively small systems, i.e., systems with an input image of
p to 55 pixels, this can easily be done; however, for
arger systems examining the key space is numerically
mpractical.
An encryption algorithm’s key space is the set of all
ossible keys that can be used to encode data by using
hat algorithm. For instance, a simple combination lock
ith three dials, each with ten digits, has a key space of
000 keys, i.e., 103. The number of possible combinations
rows exponentially with the number of dials (equivalent
o the number of pixels in our study). The size of the key
pace determines the number of possible unique keys that
an be used by the DRPE algorithm. The number of keys
n the key space is given by the number of quantization
evels used in the key, raised to the power of the number
f pixels in the key. Thus, for example, a system with N
55 pixels and 2 quantization levels has 225 keys, or
3,554,432 keys in its key space. Recently reported simu-
ations for such a system have shown [23] that there is
inimal security improvement if keys with more than 16
uantization levels are employed. However, for larger sys-
ems, i.e., 256256 pixels with 16 quantization levels
having 1665,536 keys in the key space), checking every
ingle key is currently not practical. Like most encryption
echniques DRPE relies heavily on the large size of its key
pace to provide security from brute-force attacks, i.e.,
hat the probability of randomly guessing a correct key is
tatistically insignificant.
The way in which the wrongness of the decryption key
s quantified is of great significance in estimating both the
obustness to noise and the security of the system. Typi-
ally, in the DRPE literature, the deviation of the de-
rypted image from the input image is quantified by using
he normalized root mean squared (NRMS) error. It is
opular since, given a cipher–text pair, the success of at-
empts at decryption can be quantified naturally by using
he intensity-error-based NRMS. Heuristic attempts to
reak the DRPE have been implemented in which the
RMS error is used as the Cost Function (CF) in an it-
rative search procedure [19]. Thus the NRMS value as-
igns a quantitative level of validity, or correctness, to
ach possible decryption key in the key space.
The presence of an incorrect Fourier key will introduce
rrors in both the amplitude and the phase of the output
eld. In this paper we begin by verifying that this com-
lex noise is circular Gaussian. Given the statistical prop-
rties of this noise we then derive analytic expressions for
he mean and variance of the sum of the square of the dif-
erence between the intensity values of the pixels in the
riginal input image and the decrypted image. This is the
ifference parameter d, which we explicitly define in Sec-
ion 3.
Should the attacker have access to a cipher–text pair, it
as already been shown that in the case of AE, heuristic
ethods [19] can be used to extract the DRPE Fourierey, R2,e, with an NMRS error less than 10%, within a
easonable amount of time, i.e., within less than an hour,
y using a standard PC (Intel P4 2.5 GHz). Extensions of
his method can also be used if several cipher–text pairs
re available when the system is attacked, and such tech-
iques can be very effective [24,25].
We wish to study the errors in the output (decrypted)
mage intensity for a sample set of keys in a large system
256256 pixels. In previous work [22] we examined the
RPE technique’s key space, using histograms showing
he number of keys that decrypt an encoded message to
articular NRMS values. As noted, this analysis was per-
ormed only for small input image sizes, i.e., 5
5 pixels. By deriving statistical expressions for the
ean and the variance of the intensity difference param-
ter d, which is closely related to the NRMS, we aim to
acilitate study and analysis of the key space for larger in-
ut images.
In [22] (see Fig. 7 in Ref. [22]), we presented the results
f a simulation where one million random phase keys
ere used in an attempt to decrypt a large system (256
256 pixels with 8 phase quantization levels) via a brute-
orce method. In [22] it is shown that for such a large key
pace the mean value of the NRMS is 1 and that the
ariance of the NRMS, which is related to the distribution
f the keys in key space, decreases significantly from that
bserved for smaller key spaces. However, these results
ere based on examining the results from a very small
umber of possible keys from the total key space. To
erify this result a statistical analysis must be used. In
his paper it is shown that as the number of samples is
ncreased (i.e., the number of pixels in a phase key or im-
ge increases, and/or the number of simulation runs for a
arge number of possible decryption keys increases), the
RMS values tend toward the statistically predicted lim-
ting results. In this way we verify the validity of the sta-
istical results derived and presented here and also con-
rm the observations made in [22] regarding the
ifferences between the results for large and small sys-
ems.
At the heart of this paper are d and the NRMS, which
e use as metrics to quantify key error. One other pos-
ible metric might be the Euclidean distance in key space
etween an incorrect decryption key and the correct key.
owever, such a distance is not a good measure of the cor-
ectness of the key, as it does not predict the resulting
MRS error in the decrypted image. To prove this we note
hat in a previous paper [22] we showed that, for AE
RPE, the key space for a system with 256 quantization
evels will have 256 valid keys that decrypt the system
ith zero NRMS error. All but one of these keys are large
uclidean distances from the encryption key, R2,e. There-
ore, given the typical assumption that a potential at-
acker may have access to a cipher–text pair but defi-
itely does not have access to the correct decryption key,
he NRMS clearly has a practical role in providing an in-
irect measure of a possible decryption key’s accuracy.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 some
tatistical results, regarding the properties of circular
aussian noise, are provided. In Section 3 the NRMS CF
nd the difference parameter d, for use in relation to the
RPE technique are presented. A significant conjecture is
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Monaghan et al. Vol. 26, No. 9 /September 2009 /J. Opt. Soc. Am. A 2035lso made in this section regarding the mathematical de-
cription of such a field. In Section 4, assuming power
onservation, we derive analytic expressions for the mean
nd variance of d in terms of the circular Gaussian noise
n the decrypted output field. In Section 5 we provide the
esults of some numerical simulations which, for a large
umber of samples, confirm both the circular Gaussian
ature of the output field noise and support the validity of
he conjecture made in Section 3, (when errors are ran-
omly introduced in the Fourier plane key). In this sec-
ion we also show that when the errors in R2,d are ran-
omly distributed spatially there is a highly correlated
inear relationship between the number of pixels in error
n R2,d and the expected value of the parameter , E%R,
used in our conjecture, in Section 3), calculated for a sub-
et of keys from the key-space in which the percentage of
ixels in error are the same. In Section 6 we make some
omparisons with previous results in the literature [22],
nd in Section 7 we present our overall conclusions.
. STATISTICS: DEFINITIONS AND
OTATION
ome statistical definitions and mathematical results
sed throughout this paper are presented.
. Mean and Variance
et us assume the existence of a real valued continuous
unction, fx, which has been sampled discretely K times,
kK+1. Denoting this sampled function as fk, if it is
eal, then fk= f*k, where * denotes complex conjuga-
ion. For a real valued random variable, the mean can be
efined as the expectation of that random variable. For a
arge number of samples, the population mean, or ex-
ected value of the data set f, is given by
Ef =  =
1
Kk=1
k=K
fk. 1
he variance of the data set f is a measure of the statis-
ical dispersion of data about the mean and is calculated
y averaging the squared distances of the possible values
rom the expected value, i.e., it is the square of the stan-
ard deviation, and for K1 it is given by
Vf = 2 =
1
Kk=1
k=K
fk − Ef2. 2
he variance of f can also be written as
Vf = Ef2 − Ef2. 3
. Properties of Gaussian Noise
et us assume we have a set, g, of samples, gk, whose
tatistical properties are well described by a normalized
aussian probability distribution function (PDF) of mean
g=, and variance Vg=2. The PDF of g is of the
ormN,;x =
1
	22 exp
 x − 
2
22  , 4
here x represents a particular value taken by gk when
is very large, and the probability distribution function
ndicates the probability (frequency) of such a value oc-
urring.
Gaussian distributions obey the Gaussian moment
heorem. If we define the nth moment of the Gaussian
andom variable x about the value z as
Mn,z =
−
+
x − znN,;xdx, 5
hen Ex=M1,0, and Vx=M2,.
The assumption of the presence of Gaussian noise has
mportant ramifications:
1. First, and equivalent to Eq. (3), we note that the
ean of the data values squared is equal to the sum of the
quare of their mean and their variance:
Eg2 = 2 + 2. 6
2. Second, and of particular significance to our analy-
is, when the noise is complex valued it is referred to as
ircular Gaussian noise. In this case we define a complex
oise function, n, and a sampled version, nk=nrk
jnik. Both nr and ni are assumed to be two uncorre-
ated white noises with zero means, r=i=0, and identi-
al standard variations, r=i=, where r denotes the
eal, and i denotes the imaginary parts.
We can summarize the statistical properties of such
oise as follows:
En = Enr,i = 0, 7
Vnr,i = 2 = Enr,i
2 . 8
he positive real valued intensity (magnitude squared) of
he noise is defined as
nn* = n*n = n2 = nr2 + ni2; 9
herefore
En2 = Enr2 + ni2 = Enr2 + Eni2 = 22. 10
ome further properties are discussed in Section 3. First
e define and examine the NRMS.
. NORMALIZED ROOT MEAN SQUARED
RROR
e first recall that all incorrect phase keys are in the sys-
em key space and can be used as possible decryption
eys. We wish to compare an image (data array) and a
erturbed or noisy version of that image. In this paper
hese noisy output images arise because an incorrect Fou-
ier decryption key, R2,d=exp−j2bu ,v, is used follow-
ng perfect encryption. For perfect decryption b=b, im-
lying that R2,d=R2,e
* . Such a comparison corresponds to
ne step (iteration) of a process by which an attacker at-
empts to acquire the correct decryption key. In this case
he attacker knows a priori the number of pixels and
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rom within the key space, achieves only partial or incom-
lete decryption. In our case the output data sets corre-
pond to intensities (images) captured by a CCD. More
pecifically, the two 2D data sets, that we compare (i.e.,
se to generate the NRMS CF) correspond to the intensi-
ies (images) input to the encryption system and the re-
ulting decrypted image at the output of the decryption
ystem. We denote the original image by I and the de-
rypted image by Id, where Id can be a correctly or incor-
ectly decrypted image. It should be noted, for clarity, that
f the correct R2,d is used then the NRMS error value
hould be 0; however, for an R2,d containing randomly
hosen pixel values, i.e., typically an incorrect key from
he key space of the system, the NRMS error value has
een numerically observed to be on average 1 [22].
We note that the effects on the output of perturbations
way from the exact encryption key can be analogous to
he effects of noise accumulated in the system during any
xperimental implementation. Analyzing such effects
herefore also provides insights into the robustness
gainst noise of the DRPE technique.
As stated, the metric employed to quantify the quality
f the decryption is the NRMS:
	p=1p=NIp − Idp2
p=1
p=NIp2
, 11
here N is the number of pixels in the image. Central to
his metric is the difference term
d = 
p=1
p=N
Ip − Idp2. 12
his difference term is used to form the basis of the fol-
owing analysis of the effects of the noise in Id on the per-
ormance of the DRPE technique for the AE case.
The decrypted complex field data is given by
Ad = I
−1I−1IIfR1,e  I−1I−1IR2,e  I−1R2,d
13
=fR1,e  IR2,d  IR2,e, 14
here  and  denote the convolution and correlation op-
rations.
Following [15] we now make a conjecture regarding the
orm of the output decrypted complex field. We propose
hat the amplitude of an attempted decryption can be
ritten as
Ad ·   f ·  + n · , 15
here  is a different constant for each decryption key ex-
mined, f is the input signal (image), and n represents cir-
ular white Gaussian noise with zero mean; see Section 2.
n [21] it was reported that an incorrect R2,d key resulted
n such Gaussian noise n being observed in the output im-
ge. The parameter  plays a significant role in our later
nalysis; see Section 5.
In the case of AE the input intensity is given by I= f2
f2. Applying our conjecture, Eq. (15), the corresponding
utput decrypted image intensity is given byId = f + n2 = 2f2 + f2nr + n2. 16
ince our encryption system is lossless, power will be con-
erved and the total input intensity must be equal to the
otal output intensity. The implications of this require-
ent are examined later in Subsection 4.B; however, we
rst return to our definition of d, given in Eq. (12). For
ach particular case, i.e., an input image and decryption
ey, we substitute from Eq. (16) and then rewrite Eq. (12)
n terms of the individual image pixel values 1	p	N,
iving
d = 
p=1
p=N
2 − 1f2p + 2fpnrp + np22. 17
xpanding Eq. (17) this gives
d = 2 − 12
p=1
p=N
f4p + 42 − 1
p=1
p=N
f3pnrp
+ 22 − 1
p=1
p=N
f2pnp2 + 42
p=1
p=N
f2pnr
2p
+ 4
p=1
p=N
fpnrpnp2 + 
p=1
p=N
np4. 18
he mean and variance of d are now discussed.
. STATISTICS OF THE DIFFERENCE TERM
. Expected Value of d
ll of the sums over the number of pixels N in Eq. (18) are
eplaced by the corresponding average values multiplied
y N:
d = 2 − 12Ef4pN + 42 − 1Ef3pnrpN
+ 22 − 1Ef2pnp2N + 42Ef2pnr
2pN
+ 4Efpnrpnp2N + Enp4N. 19
f in Eq. (19) the expected values are calculated over the
arge number of pixels, and based on the assumption that
and n are statistically independent, we can assume [26]
hat
Efknr
l  Efk Enr
l, 20
Efkn2l  Efk En2l. 21
e note that while we use these expressions at this point
n our calculation, later we will proceed to calculate ex-
ected values, i.e., sums, over all R possible keys in key
pace, and this should further improve the validity of Eq.
20) and (21).
Using Eq. (20) and (21) we can rewrite Eq. (19) as
d/N = 2 − 12Ef4p + 42 − 1Ef3pEnrp
+ 22 − 1Ef2pEnp2 + 42Ef2pEnr
2p
+ 4EfpEnrpnp2 + Enp4. 22
ote that we now express d per pixel. From Eq. (1),
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1
Np=1
p=N
fmp, 23
npm = Enmp 
1
Np=1
p=N
nmp, 24
npm = Enpm 
1
Np=1
p=N
npm. 25
quations (23)–(25) simplify Eq. (22) to
d = d/N = 2 − 12f4 + 42 − 1f3nr,p + 22 − 1f2np2
+ 42f2nr,p
2 + 4f1nr,pnp2 + np4. 26
he expected value of d=d /N is now calculated over a
arge number of runs, i.e., over all R possible decryption
hase keys in key space. During each run it is assumed
hat the same input image is used; however, as the de-
ryption keys change, the  value will also change:
E
R
d = E
R
2 − 12f4 + 4f3E
R
2 − 1nr,p + 2f2E
R
2 − 1
np2 + 4f2E
R
2nr,p
2  + 4f1E
R
nr,pnp2 + E
R
np4.
27
xpanding Eq. (27) gives that
E
R
d = f4E
R
4 − 2E
R
2 + 1 + 4f3E
R
E
R
2 − 1E
R
nr,p
+ 2f2E
R
2 − 1E
R
np2 + 4f2E
R
2E
R
nr,p
2 
+ 4f1E
R
E
R
nr,pE
R
np2 + E
R
np4. 28
ecalling that the noise is assumed to be circular Gauss-
an, we apply the Gaussian moment theorem, using Eq.
2.8.22) in [26], to obtain
En4 = 2En22, 29
En2n = 0, En2 0. 30
ecall that averaging has already taken place over N.
ubstituting into Eq. (28), using Eqs. (20), (21), (23)–(25),
29), and (30), and assuming that R is very large (all pos-
ible keys in key space), we can write that
E
R
d =  lim
R→
1
Rr˜=1
R
4r˜ − 2 lim
R→
1
Rr˜=1
R
2r˜ + 1f4
+ 2f2 lim
R→
1
Rr˜=1
R
2r˜ − 122
+ 4f2 lim
R→
1
Rr˜=1
R
2r˜2 + 84. 31
. Power Conservation
n order that power be conserved, and recalling Eq. (15),
e note that1
Np=1
N
f + n2 =
1
Np=1
N
f2. 32
alculating the expected value over R of Eq. (32) gives us
n expression for 2. Simplifying Eq. (32) and using Eq.
10), We can derive Eq. (8) (see Appendix 10.1 of [27]):
2 = 
 lim
R→
1
Rr˜=1
R
1 − r˜2 f22 . 33
t is observed from numerical simulations (see Subsection
.B) that the expected values of  and 2 (over all R keys
n key space) are very small, E
R
E
R
20, and all the
ther terms in Eq. (31) are large in comparison. Thus,
ubstituting Eq. (33) back into Eq. (31) and applying the
imit as R tends to infinity, it can be shown that
E
R
d = 1 − E
R
r˜2− 2f2
2E
R
r˜2 + f41 − E
R
r˜2  f4,
34
here f2 and f4 are as defined in Eq. (23). The assump-
ions made regarding E
R
 and E
R
2 are discussed later
n Subsection 5.B.
. Variance of d
e now wish to find V
R
d, therefore we must calculate
R
d2. Equation (35), derived by using Eq. (5), is em-
loyed to derive the higher-order expected values of the
oise terms:
Enr,i
q  =
q
	2
q/2−11 + − 1q
1 + q2  . 35
sing this, it can be shown that
E
R
d2 = − 4f2
2f4E
R
2− 1 + E
R
23 + f4
2− 1 + E
R
24
+ 4f2
4E
R
24 − 5E
R
2 + 2E
R
4. 36
pplying this result, and using Eqs. (3), (34), and (36), the
ariance of d is given by
V
R
d = − 4f2
2f4E
R
2− 1 + E
R
23 + f4
2− 1 + E
R
24
+ 4f2
4E
R
24 − 5E
R
2 + 2E
R
4 − 1 − E
R
r˜2
− 2f2
2E
R
r˜2 + f41 − E
R
r˜22  f4
2 − f4
2  0.
37
n summary, E
R
d /N= 1/N1
NI2p, and V
R
d /N=0.
. NUMERICALLY TEST THE VALIDITY OF
HE CONJECTURE, EQ. (15): GAUSSIAN
OISE AND  PARAMETER
he analysis presented in Section 4 assumes that Eq. (15)
s valid, i.e., that Adpfp+np. Using the mean and
ariance of d , Eq. (34) and (37), we can test the conjec-
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q. (15) into real and imaginary parts:
ReAdp   Refp + Renp, 38
ImAdp   Imfp + Imnp. 39
or the AE case Imfp=0; furthermore, if there is no
oise present, then Adp= fp and =1. In general the
th pixel of the decrypted image, Adp, is a complex val-
ed random variable, and since we assume that np is
ircular Gaussian noise, we can calculate  for any par-
icular input image and decryption key as follows:
 =
p=1
N
ReAdp 
p=1
N
fp, 40
here ReAdp is the real part of the pth pixel in the de-
rypted image.
. Gaussian Noise and the Normalized Root
ean Squared
sing the standard 256256 pixel Lena test image [28]
imulations were run of the AE DRPE technique for de-
ryption by using incorrect random phase keys, R2,d. Us-
ng a completely random choice of decryption keys our
imulations lead us to expect to calculate a high error
alue, i.e., NRMS1. Such a simulation was performed
000 times using different random phase keys, both for
ncryption and decryption, but always assuming perfect
ncryption and performing incorrect decryption. A pseu-
orandom number generator from Matlab [29] was used
o generate the random phase keys with the generator be-
ng initialized by a 35-element vector based on the cur-
ent state of the clock, thus avoiding repetition. For each
un, once  was found, ReAdp−fp was plotted for
ach of the pixels. The average is calculated over the en-
ire 1000 runs. If the noise is circular Gaussian, the result
hould have a Gaussian distribution with a mean value of
ero. This is found to be the case (see Fig. 1). The corre-
ig. 1. (Color online) ReAdp−fp and ImAdp averaged
ver 1000 runs, for randomly chosen keys, for the 256
256 pixel Lena test image. The results are Gaussian and sup-
ort the conjecture made in Eq. (15). As the total NRMS error
alue for an attempted decryption decreases, the area under the
orresponding Gaussian noise graph decreases.ponding imaginary parts, ImAdp, are also plotted,
nd the two curves coincide and are visually indistin-
uishable.
Figure 2 is a plot of the individual NRMS error values
or these 1000 runs and highlights the fact that com-
letely random key selection produces large random
RMS error values with an average value close to 1.
In Fig. 3 the NRMS errors (vertical axis) are plotted as
function of the fixed percentage of the pixels in the de-
ryption key that are incorrect. For example, on the hori-
ontal axis at the 50% mark every single pixel in this par-
icular Fourier decrypting key (65,536 pixels in total) is
ssigned a value with a 50% probability that it is from the
orrect decryption key and a 50% probability that it is a
seudorandomly chosen phase value. The range of Fou-
ier keys examined includes incorrect keys, with NRMS
1, and decryption keys resulting in almost perfect de-
ryption, i.e., NRMS0.
It should be emphasized that the incorrect pixels in
2,d are randomly distributed spatially throughout the
ig. 2. (Color online) NRMS, Eq. (11), error values for each of
he 1000 runs, with different keys used to generate Fig. 1. The
verage NRMS value here is calculated to be 1.0001, which is
ery close to 1.
ig. 3. (Color online) The blue curve (hidden blue triangles),
lotted using Eq. (11), represents the direct NRMS calculated
rom the standard error metric. The red curve (red overlapping
ircles) is plotted by using Eq. (34), derived in Section 4, and is a
lose approximation to the numerical NRMS values (small black
riangle). The dashed box relates to Fig. 4.
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Monaghan et al. Vol. 26, No. 9 /September 2009 /J. Opt. Soc. Am. A 2039ecryption key. It has been observed from numerical
imulations that if these errors are concentrated within a
articular region of the decryption key, then results are
roduced that are not consistent with those presented
ater in this section.
In Fig. 3 the NRMS error values calculated by using
q. (11) are represented by blue triangles (nearly hidden
ere). They are compared with the values calculated
hen Eq. (34) is substituted back into Eq. (11), repre-
ented by red circles. The two curves in Fig. 3 deviate
lightly from one another but are very similar. In Fig. 4
n enlarged section of Fig. 3 is shown. As in Fig. 3, Fig.
(a) is based on a single run of the simulation and high-
ights the deviations between the NRMS calculated by us-
ng Eq. (11) (blue triangles) and the NRMS calculated
hen Eq. (34) is substituted back into Eq. (11) (red
ircles). Figure 4(b) shows the average curves plotted,
enerated for 500 individual simulations, i.e., runs using
ifferent decryption keys.
ig. 4. (Color online) (a) Enlarged region indicated by the
ashed box in Fig. 3. The NRMS error is plotted against the per-
entage of correct pixel values retained in R2,d, during decryp-
ion. If 20% of R2,d is correct, then it implies that 80% of R2,d is
ade up of pseudorandomly generated, incorrect, quantization
evels. (a) Two curves for 1 run of the simulation, large variations
n the actual NRMS (blue curve) can be seen. (b) Curves plotted
hen averaged over 500 runs.It can be observed that as the number of samples (pix-
ls and runs) used increases, the simulated NRMS val-
es, Eq. (11), approaches the NRMS curve based on the
alues predicted by using Eq. (34). The same trend is ob-
erved when, instead of averaging over many different de-
ryption key runs for an image with a small number of
ixels, averaging takes place over fewer runs but for an
mage with a much larger number of pixels. This high-
ights the validity and accuracy of the theoretical expres-
ions. Different input grayscale images [28] were tested
or image sizes of up to 106 pixels. All of the trends ob-
erved above using the Lena image were consistently re-
roduced.
Figure 5 contains three curves: (i) ERd2, Eq. (34)
blue with triangle); (ii) ERd2, Eq. (36) (red with circle);
nd (iii) VRd, Eq. (37) (green with square). Examining
his figure, we can see that the variance of d, assuming
R0, is very small, i.e., VRd=5.410−7. The
urves in Figure 5 show the corresponding relationship
etween the expected value squared, ERd2, and the
ariance, VRd. It should be noted that in order to cal-
ulate the corresponding mean of the NRMS, ERd must
e substituted back into Eq. (11).
.  Parameter
ntensive numerical simulations have been performed in-
olving thousands of randomly chosen keys (though still a
mall percentage of all R possible keys in the key space).
t has been observed that ER0. However, in general,
or a particular subset of the R keys, this does not have to
e the case. To clarify, let us now examine a very particu-
ar subset of R, namely those keys in which 10% (90%) of
he pixels in the decryption Fourier key are correct (incor-
ect).
First, using the following combinatorial based expres-
ion, we calculate how many keys in the key space will
ave a particular percentage of pixels in error:
ig. 5. (Color online) (i) ERd2 (blue with triangle), (ii)
Rd2 (red with circle), and (iii) VRd (green with square).
hese curves are plotted by using the same input data and sys-
em as was used to generate Fig. 3. For all possible keys, i.e.,
ver all R, VRd=5.410−7. It should be noted that, for any
ase where the expected value for  is not 0, the expectation has
een calculated over a subset of R.
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n this expression q is the number of phase quantization
evels used in the key, and x is the number of incorrect
ixels (which defines the particular subset). In a system
ith 256256 pixels and 16 quantization levels there are
=1.61078,913 possible keys in the key space. The large
umber of keys that have 10% of the pixels correct is
.3109,249; however this is only 2.610−293% of the total
umber of keys, R. Clearly this is an extremely small per-
entage of the total.
The expected value of  in this case, i.e., the 10% cor-
ect subset key case, is nonzero, i.e., E%R0 (see be-
ow). This is in contrast to the expected value of  calcu-
ated over the total set of R keys (the entire key-space),
hich is as stated approximately zero, ER0. As em-
hasized earlier, when performing this analysis we re-
uire that the incorrect keys used are generated by intro-
ucing errors at random spatially distributed positions in
he decryption keys. This extra requirement will in fact
educe still further the number of possible keys, within
ny such subset, %R, of all keys, R.
The central diagonal line appearing in Fig. 6 was gen-
rated numerically. It shows the  values found for keys
ith percentage errors introduced into R2,d as described
bove. For each value of percentage pixels in error the re-
ulting  values for 100 such keys are plotted. As can be
bserved, there is a highly correlated linear relationship
etween E%R and the percentage of randomly located
ixels in errors in R2,d.
To more closely examine the variation of  two histo-
rams appear as insets in Fig. 6. Each of the histograms
as generated for 1,000 runs, i.e., for the 1,000 randomly
hosen decryption Fourier keys, each of which is in a sub-
et of key space with the same percentage error. Specifi-
ally, the histograms are for the cases when (a) 10% and
b) 90% of the pixels in the decryption Fourier keys are
ig. 6. (Color online) The diagonal line is made up of 100 runs
or each percentage correct pixel case (in total 104 points). The
ross sections shown are for the cases when (a) 10% and (b) 90%
f the correct decryption key is present. Insets, histograms show-
ng the distribution of  values for the specific percentages of pix-
ls in error (1000 runs).orrect. In both histograms the E%R found supports the
xistence of the linear relationship, while the low V%R
alues indicate the high correlation of the linear relation-
hip. Furthermore, since V%R decreases from (a) 2.3
10−5 to (b) 5.810−6, it is clear that even as E%R and
he number of keys in a particular key space subset
hange, the validity of the linear relationship between the
value and the % of pixels in error still holds true.
In this section it has been shown that E%R is linearly
elated (with high correlation) to the percentage of correct
ixels in the decryption Fourier key. Based on these nu-
erical results we now claim that if, for a particular in-
orrect key, a value of  is calculated, we know with high
ertainty the percentage of correct pixels in the decryp-
ion Fourier key used. Therefore, while the NRMS error
an tell us whether or not we have a good or a bad key, the
orresponding  value can provide us with quantitative
nformation regarding the percentage of correct pixels in
he decryption key.
. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS
ESULTS
o proceed we ask the reader to examine Fig. 7 of [22].
his figure presents NRMS values calculated for 106 ran-
omly generated decrypting phase keys, R2,d, applied to
erfectly encrypted image data. In a numerically inten-
ive and incomplete way these results demonstrated that
he resultant NRMS errors, when plotted, have a bell
haped curve with a mean value of 1.
In this paper we now have put in place all the tools
eeded to provide theoretically based insights into the
bove observations. We derived a set of statistical expres-
ions, which allow us to gain knowledge about NRMS
hen it is used as the CF in the examination of the DRPE
echnique (and thus the key space) for very large numbers
f samples (pixels or runs). Using our expression for
d, given in Eq. (34), and substituting it into Eq. (11),
ig. 7. Following perfect encryption of a 256256 pixel, 16
uantization level Lena test image, 106 decrypting phase keys,
2,d, are randomly generated. It can be seen that the expected
alue of NRMS1. Furthermore, even after attempting decryp-
ion with 106 different phase keys, the lowest NRMS value cal-
ulated was 0.9998. The calculated VRd value of this curve,
ith R=106, is 3.27510−11.
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Monaghan et al. Vol. 26, No. 9 /September 2009 /J. Opt. Soc. Am. A 2041o calculate the mean of the NMRS error, we now repeat
he study performed to produced Fig. 7 in [22]. The result,
enerated by using 106 randomly chosen decryption keys,
s presented in Fig. 7 in this paper.
Figure 7 in this paper indicates that the most likely
heoretical NRMS value expected, when a randomly gen-
rated decryption key is used, has a mean value of 1. As
n Fig. 7 of [22], all one million randomly chosen decryp-
ion keys produced NRMS values between 0.9998 and 1.
n this case the calculated VRd, for the results pre-
ented in Fig. 7 in this paper, is 3.275110−11. Since the
RMS produced has a very small statistical variance and
large mean value, this indicates that employing a brute-
orce method of attack on this system would prove unsuc-
essful. The statistical results presented therefore con-
rm the previous observation made in [22] based solely on
imulations,. Considering the very narrow variance value
f the NRMS, we can confirm that the hypothesis made in
22], that the vast majority of keys will fall within a nar-
ow range of NRMS values, i.e., (0.9998, 1] in Fig. 7 in
his paper, has been shown to be true.
Visually, the most noticeable difference between the re-
ult presented in Fig. 7 in [22] and those appearing in Fig.
here is that the curve here no longer has the symmetric
istribution appearing in Fig. 7 of [22]. In this paper the
ighest possible error value achievable by using the sta-
istically calculated expressions, i.e., the largest value of
he NRMS value calculated using Ed, is 1. This is be-
ause power conservation is required, which is not the
ase for the unconstrained numerically calculated NRMS
alue whose maximum value is 	2 in [22]. This maximum
heoretical value of the NRMS occurs only when the origi-
al input image is compared with its inverse (negative
mage). We note however, that owing to our application of
he law of conservation of energy, which is explicitly built
nto the methodology employed here, it is not always pos-
ible to decrypt an encrypted image to its own negative
mage by using a phase key from the allowed systems key
pace. In other words in this paper our possible NRMS
alues are constrained by the fact that a dark low-power
mage cannot be decrypted to the corresponding bright
egative.
. CONCLUSION
he amplitude-encoding (AE) case of the double random
hase encoding (DRPE) technique is examined by using
tatistical techniques. Throughout the analysis it is as-
umed that perfect encryption takes place and the decryp-
ion process is then analyzed. This approach is of practi-
al interest as it corresponds to the case when an attacker
as knowledge of a cipher–text pair. A cost function (CF)
s needed during such an attack to gauge a possible de-
ryption keys’ accuracy, or closeness, to a valid decryption
ey. The CF typically used in the literature to quantify
he success of an attempted decryption compared with the
riginal input image is the normalized root mean squared
NRMS) error. The NRMS CF, in the AE DRPE case, is
ased on an intensity difference parameter, d. Thus the
mount of error in the output intensity following an at-
empted decryption is used as a measure of the accuracy
validity) of a particular test decryption key. The smallerhe error present in the decrypted image, the closer the
ecryption key used is to the correct key. We note that the
uclidean distance in key space, between an incorrect
nd the correct R2,d key, is not a good measure of the va-
idity of that key (i.e., its ability to decrypt correctly), and
s not a good predictor of the resulting NMRS error. Pre-
iously [22] it has been shown that keys that are a large
uclidean distance away from the correct key can still de-
rypt with very low NRMS errors
To analyse the AE DRPE case we assumed that the
oise in the output field is circular Gaussian and made a
onjecture regarding the form of the output field by intro-
ucing the  parameter. Based on simulations we first
onfirmed that the resulting output field noise is circular
aussian. Since the DRPE is lossless we then examined
ow power conservation places restrictions on the proper-
ies of the possible output fields. We then proceeded to de-
ive analytical expressions for the mean and the variance
f the intensity difference parameter d in terms of the sta-
istical properties of the output field. A series of simula-
ions were performed to show that as the sample size used
ncreases (i.e., the number of pixels and runs for different
2,d keys), the numerical results tend toward the statisti-
ally derived analytic expressions. Our results verify the
alidity of the theoretical expressions for large systems
nd also confirm our observation that for small systems
he NRMS values can vary significantly.
We have shown for the case where the errors in R2,d are
andomly distributed spatially that there is a highly cor-
elated linear relationship between E%R and the subset
f keys with a particular percentage of pixels in error, %R.
ased on our results it can be stated that, in general, if 
s known, then, with high certainty, the percentage of cor-
ect pixels in the decryption Fourier key used is also
nown. This observation might be used to significantly re-
uce the size of the key space to be searched during an
ttack or conversely be used to improve AE DRPE secu-
ity.
In a previous publication [22] both small and large key
paces were examined. The results presented here have
een shown to corroborate the previously published re-
ults based solely on intensive but limited numerical
imulations [22]. Thus the hypothesis made in [22] that
he vast majority of keys in this AE DRPE key-space, lie
n the curve formed by these one million randomly chosen
eys, has been statistically confirmed.
CKNOWLEDGMENTS
e acknowledge the support of Enterprise Ireland (EI)
nd Science Foundation Ireland (SFI). We also thank the
rish Research Council for Science, Engineering and Tech-
ology. D. S. Monaghan acknowledges the support of The
nternational Society for Optical Engineering (SPIE)
hrough a SPIE Educational Scholarship.
EFERENCES
1. H. O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Naval
Institute Press, 1931).
2. G. F. Gaines, Cryptanalysis: A Study of Ciphers and Their
Solution (Dover, 1939).
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2042 J. Opt. Soc. Am. A/Vol. 26, No. 9 /September 2009 Monaghan et al.3. W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in
cryptography,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 22, 644–654
(1976).
4. C. A. Deavours, Cryptology Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow
(Artech House, 1987).
5. P. Réfrégier and B. Javidi, “Optical-image encryption based
on input plane and Fourier plane random encoding,” Opt.
Lett. 20, 767–769 (1995).
6. B. Javidi and J. L. Horner, “Optical pattern recognition for
validation and security verification,” Opt. Eng. 33, 224–230
(1994).
7. B. Javidi, Optical and Digital Techniques for Information
Security (Springer Verlag, 2005).
8. E. Tajahuerce and B. Javidi, “Encrypting three-
dimensional information with digital holography,” Appl.
Opt. 39, 6595–6601 (2000).
9. L. E. M. Brackenbury and K. M. Bell, “Optical encryption
of digital data,” Appl. Opt. 39, 5374–5379 (2000).
0. G. Unnikrishnan, J. Joseph, and K. Singh, “Optical
encryption by double-random phase encoding in the
fractional Fourier domain,” Opt. Lett. 25, 887–889 (2000).
1. B. M. Hennelly and J. T. Sheridan, “Optical image
encryption by random shifting in fractional Fourier
domains,” Opt. Lett. 28, 269–271 (2003).
2. T. J. Naughton and B. Javidi, “Compression of encrypted
three-dimensional objects using digital holography,” Opt.
Eng. 43, 2233–2238 (2004).
3. B. M. Hennelly and J. T. Sheridan, “Optical encryption and
the space bandwidth product,” Opt. Commun. 247, 291–305
(2005).
4. B. Javidi, A. Sergent, G. S. Zhang, and L. Guibert, “Fault
tolerance properties of a double phase encoding encryption
technique,” Opt. Eng. 36, 992–998 (1997).
5. F. Goudail, F. Bollaro, B. Javidi, and P. Réfrégier,
“Influence of a perturbation in a double phase-encoding
system,” J. Opt. Soc. Am. A 15, 2629–2638 (1998).
6. B. Javidi, N. Towghi, N. Maghzi, and S. C. Verrall, “Error-
reduction techniques and error analysis for fully phase-and amplitude-based encryption,” Appl. Opt. 39, 4117–4130
(2000).
7. B. M. Hennelly and J. T. Sheridan, “Image encryption and
the fractional Fourier transform,” Optik (Stuttgart) 114,
251–265 (2003).
8. B. M. Hennelly and J. T. Sheridan, “Random phase and
jigsaw encryption in the Fresnel domain,” Opt. Eng. 43,
2239–2249 (2004).
9. U. Gopinathan, D. S. Monaghan, T. J. Naughton, and J. T.
Sheridan, “A known-plaintext heuristic attack on the
Fourier plane encryption algorithm,” Opt. Express 14,
3181–3186 (2006).
0. T. J. Naughton, B. Hennelly, and T. Dowling, “Introducing
secure modes of operation for optical encryption,” J. Opt.
Soc. Am. A 25, 2608–2617 (2008).
1. D. S. Monaghan, G. Situ, U. Gopinathan, T. J. Naughton,
and J. T. Sheridan, “Role of phase key in the double
random phase encoding technique: an error analysis,” Appl.
Opt. 47, 3808–3816 (2008).
2. D. S. Monaghan, U. Gopinathan, T. J. Naughton, and J. T.
Sheridan, “Key-space analysis of double random phase
encryption technique,” Appl. Opt. 46, 6641–6647 (2007).
3. D. S. Monaghan, G. Situ, G. Unnikrishnan, T. J. Naughton,
and J. T. Sheridan, “Analysis of phase encoding for optical
encryption,” Opt. Commun. 282, 482–492 (2008).
4. G. Situ, U. Gopinathan, D. S. Monaghan, and J. T.
Sheridan, “Cryptanalysis of optical security systems with
significant output images,” Appl. Opt. 46, 5257–5262
(2007).
5. Y. Frauel, A. Castro, T. J. Naughton, and B. Javidi,
“Resistance of the double random phase encryption against
various attacks,” Opt. Express 15, 10253–10265 (2007).
6. J. W. Goodman, Statistical Optics (Wiley, 2000).
7. D. S. Monaghan, “Practical implementations and
theoretical analysis of optical encryption,” Ph.D.
dissertation (University College Dublin, 2009).
8. Lena Test Image, http://sipi.usc.edu/database/.
9. Matlab 7.0.1, http://www.mathworks.com/.
